FreshPorts - VuXML

The X.Org project reports:

CVE-2023-43788: Out of bounds read in XpmCreateXpmImageFromBuffer

An out-of-bounds read is located in ParseComment() when reading from a memory buffer instead of a file, as it continued to look for the closing comment marker past the end of the buffer.

CVE-2023-43789: Out of bounds read on XPM with corrupted colormap

A corrupted colormap section may cause libXpm to read out of bounds.

< 3.5.17

The X.Org project reports:

1. CVE-2022-46285: Infinite loop on unclosed comments

   When reading XPM images from a file with libXpm 3.5.14 or older, if a comment in the file is not closed (i.e. a C-style comment starts with "/*" and is missing the closing "*/"), the ParseComment() function will loop forever calling getc() to try to read the rest of the comment, failing to notice that it has returned EOF, which may cause a denial of service to the calling program.

   This issue was found by Marco Ivaldi of the Humanativa Group's HN Security team.

   The fix is provided in https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxpm/-/commit/a3a7c6dcc3b629d7650148

2. CVE-2022-44617: Runaway loop on width of 0 and enormous height

   When reading XPM images from a file with libXpm 3.5.14 or older, if a image has a width of 0 and a very large height, the ParsePixels() function will loop over the entire height calling getc() and ungetc() repeatedly, or in some circumstances, may loop seemingly forever, which may cause a denial of service to the calling program when given a small crafted XPM file to parse.

   This issue was found by Martin Ettl.

   The fix is provided in https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxpm/-/commit/f80fa6ae47ad4a5beacb28 and https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/lib/libxpm/-/commit/c5ab17bcc34914c0b0707d

3. CVE-2022-4883: compression commands depend on $PATH

   By default, on all platforms except MinGW, libXpm will detect if a filename ends in .Z or .gz, and will when reading such a file fork off an uncompress or gunzip command to read from via a pipe, and when writing such a file will fork off a compress or gzip command to write to via a pipe.

   In libXpm 3.5.14 or older these are run via execlp(), relying on $PATH to find the commands. If libXpm is called from a program running with raised privileges, such as via setuid, then a malicious user could set $PATH to include programs of their choosing to be run with those privileges.

   This issue was found by Alan Coopersmith of the Oracle Solaris team.

< 3.5.15